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Abstract
Patents are legal instruments that protect ideas, and the rise of a knowledge-based
society was inevitably accompanied with their increased economic importance. As a
result of this growth, patented technology became an indispensable element of firms,
governments, and modern economies. Nevertheless, patents preserve their economic
value only if they can be enforced in court, which is, in fact, a trait common to various
instruments designed to protect intellectual property. However, contract enforcement is
often imperfect. Therefore, the protection offered by patents is not absolute, raising a
number of implications for their use.
This thesis studies the use of intellectual property rights, with a focus on technology
transfer through licensing. In particular, it examines the choice of a licensing mode by
a patent owner when the protected technology can be transferred and imitated. Addi-
tional emphasis is put on the impact of patenting and secrecy on the strategic behaviour
of innovating firms, specifically on the incentives to license and imitate. It also analyses
the litigation of patented technology that is prone to imitation when the legal protection
is imperfect. The main results derived from the analysis can be summarised as follows.
First, the analysis shows that the licensing mode of intellectual property is a strate-
gic choice primarily driven by the relative magnitudes of the per-unit production costs,
the magnitude of innovation—the reduction in the per-unit cost because of the new
technology—and the imitation cost. Particularly, licensing by way of a per-unit royalty
might be preferable to licensing by way of a fixed fee from the viewpoint of a patent
owner, while fixed-fee licensing might be at least as good as royalty licensing for con-
sumers. Additionally, licensing might be used to prevent imitation, but might not be
used to strategically select competition before patent expiry.
Second, the analysis finds that the availability of a choice of protection affects the
strategic behaviour of innovating firms and the type of inventions licensed in the in-
dustry. Patenting might be more or less preferable than secrecy from the viewpoint of
a technology owner, depending on the efficiency of the imitation technology and the
strength of intellectual property protection. Furthermore, highly inefficient imitation
technologies might render licensing preferable to imitation, while highly efficient imita-
tion technologies might lead to more imitation than licensing. Acknowledging that a
trade secret might leak to the public and also considering that the probability of leakage
might increase with the number of firms practising the secret, the analysis suggests an
increase in the attractiveness of patent protection.
Third, the analysis also finds that licensing, imitating, and litigating over a patented
technology is dependent on the magnitude of innovation, the efficacy of imitation, and
the strength of the judicial system: the degree to which increased litigation spending
can influence the outcome of the court. When litigants expect to settle the dispute
out of court, a sufficiently small magnitude of innovation might lead to licensing before
imitation (an ex-ante licence), while a sufficiently large magnitude of innovation might
lead to licensing after imitation (an ex-post licence). In addition, a patent owner benefits
by taking no action against a highly imperfect imitation.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to study the strategic use of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs) by focusing on technology transfer through licensing. We develop
a theoretical framework to analyse the strategic interaction of innovating firms in an
oligopolistic industry, when intellectual property can be transferred and imitated. Ac-
knowledging that intellectual property is prone to imitation and considering that legal
protection is not perfect, we aim to predict the licensing behaviour of firms endowed with
intellectual property. Moreover, looking at the choice between patents and secrecy, we
examine the licensing of proprietary technology in the context of imitation. We also take
a comprehensive look on how licensing can be used to prevent or settle patent litigation.
The overarching contribution of this thesis is to provide an integrated framework that
can be used to study the licensing of protected technology by an incumbent firm to other
firms that compete in an oligopolistic industry. The competing firms might obtain the
protected technology through a non-cooperative technology transfer or costly imitation.
The analysis acknowledges that patents only grant a temporary and contestable monopoly
power, instead of an exclusive and absolute one. Additionally, it considers that legal
protection is not perfect and that the efficiency of the imitation technology might vary
(imperfect imitation). Overall, the thesis covers the following issues.
First, the theoretical framework is used to predict the licensing behaviour of a patent
owner and its impacts on the distribution of profits in the industry, the incentives to
imitate, competition, and consumer surplus. Second, we explore the interplay between
the choice of protecting a technological invention through a patent (requiring disclosure
of valuable information) or through a trade secret (requiring concealment of valuable
information) and the licensing and strategic interaction of innovating firms. Third, we
analyse the litigation and settlement of patent infringement disputes through a licensing
lens. Overall, the analysis can be used to partially explain the appropriability problem
that arises when firms that invest in research and development (R&D) and innovation
have difficulty securing returns on their investments.
This doctoral thesis consists of two parts. The remaining structure of the first part,
which is an introduction to the research field and topic of the thesis, is as follows. Section
2 provides the context and motivation for the three appended papers that comprise the
thesis. Section 3 reviews related theoretical and empirical literature on the economics
of innovation. Section 4 poses the general and specific research questions and describes
the methodology of the research, while Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main
findings, potential contributions, and propositions for future research. The second part
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consists of three appended papers that collectively focus on the strategic licensing of
technology.
2 Patents and Secrecy
The main economic purpose underlying the patent system is to promote research and
development. This might, in turn, lead to innovation and technological advancement.
The key channels to achieve this goal are the protection of the commercial exploitation
of technological inventions and the encouragement of the disclosure of new valuable in-
formation. The increased interest in knowledge creation over the last few years has led
to an expansion of patents in chemicals, computer electronics, communications, pharma-
ceuticals, biomedicine, biotechnology, and nanotechnology (Granstrand and Holgersson,
2012; Bourelos, 2013; Lerner and Seru, 2017). The objective of the patent system and the
availability of reasonably reliable and good data on patents have resulted in patents often
being used as proxies for innovation. However, the effectiveness of patents in achieving
an accurate and reliable estimation of investment in innovation is dependent on a number
of factors. Specifically, it depends on the ability of rival firms to imitate, the availability
of alternative protection choices, and the efficacy of the legal system in protecting IPRs
(Gallini, 1992; Crampes and Langinier, 2002). The imitation of protected inventions is,
in turn, related to the size of innovation, the efficiency of the imitation technology, as
well as the characteristics of the industry and the institutional setting. The use of an
alternative protection choice might also depend on several factors such as the type of
invention, the failure to protect essential technological information, or the availability of
licensing. Intellectual property protection therefore involves economic uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, the choice of protection poses a trade-off to innovating firms. For example,
consider patents versus secrecy: on one hand, patents grant an option to litigate against
potential infringement in exchange for a fixed protection term and information disclosure;
on the other hand, secrecy might last indefinitely, but can be lost through independent
rediscovery or accidental leakage to the public (Waldman and Jensen, 2013, Chapter 15).
We examine these issues and develop a theoretical framework that can also be used to
analyse the strategic interactions of innovating firms in other situations.
Early studies on patent races have suggested that patents might spur innovation
(Barzel, 1968; Wright, 1983; Reinganum, 1983). Considering the cumulative nature of
innovation, relatively later studies have challenged the effectiveness of the patent system
in promoting innovation (Scotchmer, 1991, 1999). Hall (2007) analysed the patent sys-
tem trade-offs using a cost-benefit framework based on two dimensions: innovation and
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competition. His analysis showed that patents might encourage innovation and technol-
ogy transfer; however, they might also increase transaction costs and monopoly power.
More recent studies have shown that patents are not effective at preventing imitation,
appropriating returns from investment in R&D, and generating licensing fees (Hall, 2007;
Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Hall et al., 2014). A number of
surveys related to the effectiveness and appropriability of patent protection have found
that firms depend heavily on alternative means of protection, particularly lead time and
secrecy (Mansfield, 1985, 1986; Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000; Arundel, 2001;
Gonzalez-Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin, 2007).1 The findings of these surveys suggest that
patents might be used for objectives other than appropriating the returns from invest-
ment in innovation. In particular, they are mostly used strategically to prevent entry,
deter imitation, and negotiate and file suits.
Trade secret law is designed to protect inventions from misappropriation, most no-
tably when the disclosure of new information is not desirable. The promotion of research
and development falls within the scope of secrecy as much as it does under that of patents.
Therefore, both protection choices might serve the same utilitarian purpose. Nonetheless,
the differences in protection between patents and secrecy have important implications on
the strategic behaviour of innovating firms and, in turn, on the diffusion of technology
through licensing (Waldman and Jensen, 2013, Chapter 15). On one hand, there are
empirical studies suggesting that licensing patented technology is easier, less costly, and
more frequent than licensing a trade secret (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). This might
indicate that the patent system is more effective in appropriating returns and encour-
aging innovation than secrecy. Patents might, in fact, be preferable to secrets in cases
where secrecy is too risky to rely upon. For example, consider industries where reverse
engineering is easy—such as pharmaceuticals—or when exclusive rights for a relatively
short period of time are preferable. On the other hand, secrecy might be considered a
better alternative to patent protection when considering the effects of rejected patent
applications on the appropriation of returns and incentives to innovate. The information
associated with an unsuccessful patent application will in any case be disclosed, wiping
out the value of a potential trade secret. This might also discourage subsequent inno-
vation. Save for the fact that both instruments are used to protect intellectual property
and, thus, have common characteristics, patents and secrecy are often mutually exclusive
means of protection.
To illustrate some of these issues, consider the candy industry. Dreyfuss and Strand-
1For a thorough review of the empirical evidence on innovation and appropriability, refer to Lopez
(2009) and the literature cited therein.
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burg (2011) describe a number of cases showing candy-makers being secretive about
candy inventions. For example, consider the chocolate protected by Spanish monks in
the sixteenth century, Mars’ secret production processes and operations, Hershey choco-
late products, and the recipe for Toblerone bars. On one hand, the candy industry is
characterised by industrial espionage—stealing from and inventing around the attempts
of competitors—in order to take competitive advantage away from rivals. On the other
hand, candy-makers report holdings of patented technology and charge royalties to trans-
fer the rights of their inventions to their competitors. For instance, consider the patents
that Mars owns on the technology of vending machines. It appears that a candy-maker
keeps others from learning certain inventions through secrecy but licenses the rights of
other inventions through patents. This raises questions regarding the incentives to de-
velop patentable inventions that are not patented but instead secretly protected, on the
basis that secrecy outweighs the term of imperfect patent protection.2
In conclusion, patents and secrecy can be complements or substitutes, or can even
be used together. Changes in policy might have ambiguous effects on the attractiveness
of one choice over the other. For example, a weak and costly patent system might
encourage greater reliance on secrecy. There are instances, however, where both choices
of protection might respond similarly to a policy change, and there are evidently other
situations where policy interventions might favour patents more than secrecy. The policy
of IPRs should thus reflect a balance of these considerations (Pepall et al., 2008). It is still
vitally important to explore the constantly changing role of IPRs to get an understanding
of how the licensing of technology works.
2.1 Licensing and Imitation
Law and economics have been studying the impact of intangibles on the incentives
of firms to invest in innovation and on economic activity for many years (see for exam-
ple, Kitch, 1977; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Granstrand, 2003; Scotchmer, 2005; Falvey
et al., 2006; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Furthermore, there
has been a growing interest over the last few decades in the exploitation of IPRs. The
value of intangibles has increased from seventeen percent of the entire market value of the
S&P 500 in 1975 to approximately eighty-seven percent in 2015.3 According to the Eu-
ropean Patent Office, ten percent of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which
represent ninety-nine percent of businesses in the EU, used IPRs to protect their inven-
2For a number of case studies on valuable trade secrets, see the online archive of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), available at www.wipo.int.
3For more information regarding the growth of intangible assets, see www.oceantomo.com.
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tions in 2015 and 2016.4 In addition, the licensing of intellectual property has become
the primary source of revenue for leading owners of standard essential patents (SEP) in
high-technology industries, most notably in computer electronics, semiconductors, and
telecommunications.5 For example, Qualcomm, a pioneer and market leader in wireless
telecommunications products and services, derived over three-quarters of its operating
profits in 2017 from patent licensing.6 Therefore, it is important to analyse the factors
underlying this unprecedented salience of intangibles and licensing activities.
In the context of this analysis, licensing is an exclusive or non-exclusive legal contract
between two parties known as the licensor and the licensee. The licensee is permitted to
use proprietary technology owned by the licensor in exchange for a fixed fee or a per-unit
royalty payment.7 The cost of licensing is often smaller than the cost of independently
developing new technology. In addition, licensing has become a strategic tool for in-
novating firms, particularly in industries where technological standards are interrelated.
For instance, patent licensing is one of the most commonly used methods of technology
transfer in information-based industries (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Prior literature has
explicitly analysed the licensing of patented cost-reducing technologies (Arrow, 1962),
licensing under asymmetric cost structures (Marjit, 1990), and optimal licensing from a
game-theoretic lens (Kamien and Tauman, 1984, 1986; Kamien et al., 1992). Other stud-
ies have analysed the impact of the magnitude of innovation on the licensing behaviour of
firms (Wang, 1998; San Martin and Saracho, 2010), alternative modes of licensing cost-
reducing inventions when the patent owner is an external inventor (a research lab) or an
incumbent firm (Sen and Tauman, 2007), and two-part tariff licensing when the compet-
ing firm can self-develop the patented technology without risking infringement (Kitagawa
et al., 2014). Overall, licensing plays a significant role in the transfer and development
of new technology.
In many different jurisdictions, firms are increasingly investing in intangible assets
(Haskel and Westlake, 2017), challenging the conventional sources of competitive advan-
tage and ways of conducting business. This phenomenon and the rising complexity of
IPRs are associated with amendments to IPRs rules and new developments in intellectual
property law. The constantly increasing importance of patents, secrecy, and other legal
instruments designed to protect ideas in the context of current economic and legislative
4For more information regarding the performance of IPRs in the EU, see www.euipo.europa.eu.
5For more information regarding the value of licensing activities, see www.wiseharbor.com and
www.marketrealist.com.
6For more information regarding the licensing business of Qualcomm, see www.qualcomm.com
and www.forbes.com.
7In a typical licensing agreement, the licensee also agrees to certain conditions regarding the
acquired use of the technology.
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developments is inducing a primarily strategic use of IPRs. This shift in focus from a
conventional use of IPRs to a mostly strategic one might partially explain the extensive
use of contractual licences of intellectual property among individuals, organizations, and
governments. The growth of licensing activities might facilitate the diffusion of technol-
ogy. This might, in turn, stimulate innovation and economic activity. However, licensing
is often associated with potential distortions (Nordhaus, 1969; Kamien and Schwartz,
1982; Pepall et al., 2008). For instance, market power built on patents and licences over
proprietary technologies tends to continue long after the expiry of the underlying con-
tracts in some situations. Collectively, these issues redefine the licensing of intellectual
property as an indisputable element of modern firms and economies.
The availability of licensing might, in turn, have different effects on innovation, de-
pending on competition, information asymmetry, and the threat of imitation. For ex-
ample, technological imitation might explain the constantly rising rate of inefficiency in
the appropriability of returns on investments. This might be a main source of under-
investment in R&D (Arrow, 1962; Martin, 2001). Imitation might reduce the value of
technological inventions, thus discouraging firms to invest in innovation. Imitation might
also explain why firms patent only a fraction of their patentable technological holdings.
Clearly, there are also positive externalities of imitation, thus a clear consensus on the
matter has not yet been reached (Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Im and Shon, 2018). Nev-
ertheless, it is beyond dispute that imitation influences the strategic behaviour of firms,
in particular with respect to licensing. Furthermore, acknowledging the importance of
IPRs, and considering their imperfections, render the imitation of intellectual property
an important issue, if not a concern, for innovating firms. This thesis studies technol-
ogy licensing, considering the availability of a choice of protection, imitation, and the
imperfect legal protection of IPRs.
2.2 Litigation
Patents, in addition of being imperfect means of protection, are increasingly being
used less for conventional reasons. Thus, studying the strategic behaviour of patent-
holding firms is important. The imperfections of the protection and legal systems have
also lead to phenomena such as patent hold-ups or hold-outs (Bessen, 2004).8 These
issues have long attracted the attention of scholars and policy-makers (Hall and Harhoff,
8A patent hold-up occurs when a patent owner waits for a company to implement a technology and
then sues for infringement aiming to obtain more than the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) royalty rate. Patent hold-out, or reverse hold-up, occurs when users of patented technology
deliberately defer or ignore the payment of fees to the patent owner (Chien, 2014; Heiden and Petit,
2017).
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2012). Prior literature has suggested that different legal regimes might induce different
strategic behaviour in firms. Consider an agreement to license a patented technology in
settlement of a patent infringement dispute out of court (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).
Prior empirical literature shows that only a small fraction of all litigated patents go to
trial (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Bessen and Meurer, 2005). Nonetheless, these
litigated patents are considered to be among the most valuable. A common explanation
for that is the large legal cost of litigation. The patent value should, thus, be considerably
high in order for litigants to engage in a costly and uncertain legal procedure. In other
words, the incentives of the litigants to avoid trial strengthen as legal costs increase.
According to Henry and Turner (2006), litigation has been increasing with the constantly
rising number of patent grants, adversely impacting the courts and innovation.
To illustrate the issues described above, consider the 2011 legal dispute where Apple
Inc. began litigating patent infringement suits against Samsung Electronics regarding
the design and technology of smartphones (Gil, 2017). In this case, imitation was clearly
a strategic choice that induced a legal suit. Whether or not the potential imitator could
benefit more by risking infringement than by paying the licensing fees was up to the court
to determine. It so happened that both firms in this legal case were rich and could afford
to spend considerable amounts in litigation. Clearly, in a litigation dispute between
a small and a large firm, the expenditure assigned to litigation might vary widely. It
is not surprising, therefore, to ask whether the amount spent in litigation might affect
the outcome of trial. In fact, increased litigation spending has a partial impact on the
outcomes of a trial and thus indisputably affects technology transfer. Nevertheless, the
legal cost is but a single factor that might explain why firms often settle out of court.
The expected size of the award of damages in the case of infringement might influence
the course of events. The availability of technology transfer through licensing might also
have an impact on litigation. In particular, licensing can be used to deter, prevent, or
privately settle an infringement dispute.
By considering the efficiency of imitation technology, the availability of licensing, and
the strength of the judicial system, we take a more comprehensive look at litigation. It is
therefore a purpose of this thesis to improve our understanding about licensing practices
and litigation to provide relevant insights regarding the strategic conduct of firms and
public policy, as well as to generate subsequent questions related to the economics of
innovation.
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3 Literature Review
This section reviews the existing literature on the licensing of proprietary technology.
First, we focus on the theoretical contributions of licensing. We then discuss selected
empirical studies on the imitation and litigation of intellectual property.
3.1 Theoretical Literature
In the 21st century, the technological progress and growth of the economy rest heav-
ily on innovation and the public policy associated with it. Patents and secrecy are legal
pretensions designed to protect intellectual property from harm over a restricted geo-
graphical area and for a fixed or undefined period of time. In general, the underlying
purpose of IPRs is to provide incentives to innovate by granting (contestable) exclusivity
and protection to firms in order to facilitate the partial (or full) recuperation of their
effort and investment in R&D. The constantly rising value of intellectual property for the
economy and the recent ubiquity of the knowledge-based society emphasised the impor-
tance of studying the strategic use of IPRs (Contractor and Lorange, 2002; Gallini and
Scotchmer, 2002; Farrell and Shapiro, 2008; May, 2013).
3.1.1 Patent Licensing
Arrow (1962) is a first attempt to study the relationship between the optimal num-
ber of licences and the industry structure. He focused on the profits that could be
generated from licensing a cost-reducing technology to a perfectly competitive industry.
McGee (1966), Scherer (1967), and (Barzel, 1968) extended the results of Arrow (1962) to
oligopoly markets and examined the relationship between patent licensing and incentives
to innovate. Kamien and Schwartz (1972) analysed the effects of rivalry on the choice of
development period and introduction time of an invention.9
Extending this early work on patent licensing, Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Kamien
and Schwartz (1982), and Gallini (1984) set the stage for a strategic analysis of licensing
technological inventions. Their work suggests that licensing might be used to lessen
the incentives of a potential entrant to develop its own technology. Moreover, Kamien
and Tauman (1984, 1986) followed up on strategic licensing by incorporating a game-
theoretic approach in the analysis. In particular, Kamien and Tauman (1986) focused
on the licensing of proprietary technology in an oligopolistic industry. Their findings
9Kitch (1977) provides a review of the early theoretical work on patent licensing.
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suggest that licensing by means of a fixed fee is preferable to licensing by means of a
per-unit royalty for both the technology owner and consumers. They also suggest that
the licensing mode and the innovation size—the cost reduction in the per-unit production
cost because of the patented technology—might determine the private value of a patent.
Similar to Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), a series of subsequent papers applied
game theory to the analysis of optimal patent design and strategic licensing (Shapiro,
1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Shepard, 1987; Kamien et al., 1988). For example,
Katz and Shapiro (1986) studied the incentives of an independent research lab to develop
an invention and license it to downstream firms in the industry. They also considered
the licensing behaviour of a research joint venture (a research lab owned by one or more
downstream firms). Marjit (1990) addressed the problem of technology transfer from a
firm with advanced technology to a rival firm with less-efficient technology. She suggests
that initial technologies between firms that are reasonably close might encourage the
transfer of technology. In other words, the magnitude of innovation or innovation size
might influence the licensing of technology. A comprehensive review of the early game-
theoretic literature on patent licensing is given by Kamien (1992).10
Wang (1998) compared the most common licensing modes of a cost-reducing technol-
ogy in a homogeneous-good Cournot duopoly. He finds that royalty licensing is at least
as good as fixed-fee licensing from the perspective of a patent owner. An explanation for
this might be the cost advantages of royalties enjoyed by the patent owner. In turn, Wang
and Yang (1999) and Wang (2002) extended the basic model to compare the licensing
modes in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot settings, respectively. Kamien and Tau-
man (2002) extended Wang (1998) to a general Cournot oligopoly market. They suggest
that an internal patent owner competing in an industry with a sufficiently large number
of firms might prefer a fixed fee to a per-unit royalty or an auction. The incentives to
innovate might, however, be maximised in a perfectly competitive industry. If, however,
the patent owner is an outsider, then auctioning is better than the other two choices;
however, his incentives to innovate are stronger when the industry is an oligopoly or a
monopoly.
Additional important studies in the field are as follows: Fauli-Oller and Sandonis
(2002), who focused on the two-part tariff licensing of a cost-reducing invention to a
single rival firm in a differentiated Bertrand or Cournot duopoly; Filippini (2002), who
10For additional references, refer to Gallini and Wright (1990), Beggs (1992), Choi (2001), and
Poddar and Sinha (2004) for licensing under informational asymmetry; Muto (1987) for re-licensing
issues; Muto (1993) for licensing and product differentiation; and Mukherjee (2001) and Kabiraj
(2004) for technology licensing under pre-commitment strategies and a Stackelberg market structure,
respectively.
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studied optimal licensing strategies in a Stackelberg duopoly economy; Sen (2002), who
analysed the licensing of a cost-reducing invention in a Cournot oligopolistic market with
at least three firms; and Sen (2005a,b), who considered optimal licensing strategies in
an oligopolistic Cournot setting with an outsider patent owner. Moreover, Maurer and
Scotchmer (2002) suggest that licensing might be used as a managerial tool to prevent
duplication even when independent invention is legal. They find that typically, the threat
of independent invention might induce a more generous licensing policy. They also show
that the incentives to innovate depend on the relative size of the cost of re-invention and
the original cost of invention. Ottoz and Cugno (2004) examined technology transfers
taking into consideration a number of licensing restrictions when rediscovery does not
risk infringement. A comprehensive review of this relatively more recent literature is
given by Sen and Tauman (2007). In this thesis, we first focus on technology licens-
ing and assume the following: no uncertainty about innovation size, certain imitation,
no infringement, and complete information, similar to the considerations of the litera-
ture described above. We determine the optimal licensing choice from the viewpoint of
the patent owner and consumers, as well as the effects of licensing on the incentives to
duplicate and competition.
Another strand of the theoretical literature explores the effects of technology licensing
on litigation. For example, Meurer (1989) examined patent litigation using a bargaining
model. He suggests that a common inventor might refuse to license a valid patent, while
the holder of a potentially invalid patent might prefer to privately settle in some situations.
Additionally, he argues that going to trial is not an intended choice, but rather a failure
to settle in private. Hause (1989) emphasised the importance of litigants having different
perceived probabilities of winning in court, as well as the impact of litigation spending
on the outcome of court proceedings. Hay (1995) used a two-round litigation model
to determine the factors that lead disputes to trial rather than to private settlement.
He suggests that asymmetric information is only one of the many reasons that might
lead infringement disputes to trial. The preparation of a legal dispute—for example the
presence of a legal cell—might also affect litigation.
Aoki and Hu (1999a,b, 2003) developed a framework that can be used to study patent
litigation in a different situation. In particular, Aoki and Hu (1999a) focused on the
effects that different rules for allocating legal costs have on settlement behaviour. They
suggest that the avoidance of legal costs remains the main factor in inducing settlements.
In addition, Aoki and Hu (1999b) studied the impact of an imperfect legal system on
the incentives of firms to innovate. They find that the threat of litigation might, in fact,
deter imitation. Aoki and Hu (2003) focused on the impact of a time factor on licensing.
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They show that licensing before patent expiry might be encouraged where litigation cost
is sufficiently large and imitation takes a sufficiently long time.
Crampes and Langinier (2002) examined the optimal reaction of a patentee in the
context of infringement. They incorporated in the analysis monitoring efforts by the
patentee to detect infringement. They suggest that such monitoring efforts might serve
as a tool to deter entry. Llobet (2003) suggested that weak patent enforcement might
be optimal for valuable inventions; this will encourage licensing and preserve the incen-
tives to innovate. Moreover, Farrell and Shapiro (2008) and Encaoua and Lefouili (2009)
discussed technology licensing where patent validity is uncertain. In particular, Encaoua
and Lefouili (2009) focused on the licensing of ‘weak patents’: patents that might be
invalidated in court with relative ease. They suggest that optimal licensing is dependent
on whether the per-unit royalty might deter litigation. Lemley and Shapiro (2013) dis-
cussed litigation in the context of the FRAND commitment, while Wyatt (2014) argued
that Nash bargaining should be used to determine reasonable royalties in a patent in-
fringement case. We also explore litigation using Nash bargaining and consider the joint
impact of the size of innovation, the efficacy of imitation, and the strength of the judicial
system. We find that licensing might occur before or after imitation, and litigation might
be settled in or out of court, depending on specific conditions.
3.1.2 Trade Secret Licensing
Friedman et al. (1991) addressed the lack of trade secret law in protecting intellectual
property against reverse engineering and accidental leakage. They suggest that secrecy
is an attractive protection choice because, in contrast to patents, it is not technology-
specific. Gallini (1992) explicitly modelled the decision of an inventor on whether to
patent or keep an invention secret, where sequential innovation is prone to costly imita-
tion. Her analysis suggests that the incentives to imitate increase throughout the life term
of the patent. Specifically, if the patent length is the only policy instrument, sufficiently
short-lived patents might be optimal to discourage imitation. If, however, patent policy
also includes patent breadth, broad patents and an adjusted patent length might lead
to a larger social surplus. These results might, in turn, have implications regarding the
rate of technology transfer and patent litigation. Takalo (1998) built on Gallini (1992)
and developed a setting where the inventor can determine the spillover level of R&D. His
findings suggest that increasing patent breadth might encourage the incentives to patent
and discourage reliance on secrecy.
Denicolo and Franzoni (2003) conducted an economic analysis of the contract theory
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of patents with an emphasis on the role of imitation and the market size of innovation.
Their findings suggest that, overall, patenting might be socially preferable to secrecy.
Kultti et al. (2006) revisited the choice between patenting and secrecy, assuming simulta-
neous innovation. They suggest that patenting is superior to secrecy because it prevents
competitors from patenting similar inventions. In a companion paper, Kultti et al. (2007)
studied the effects of patents and secrecy on the incentives of firms to innovate and social
welfare. They suggest that the patent system might encourage innovation and informa-
tion disclosure. However, patents might provide less protection than secrecy.11
Moreover, Ottoz and Cugno (2011) analysed licensing by focusing on the relationship
of duplication and social welfare, where the protection of intellectual property is composed
of a mixture of patents and trade secrets. Hall et al. (2014) provide an excellent review
of the theoretical and empirical literature related to the trade-off between patents and
secrecy, while Yeh (2016) overviews the features of trade secret law. In our analysis, we
consider patenting and secrecy to be mutually exclusive protection choices. Moreover,
we acknowledge that imitation is costly, uncertain, and takes time to materialise. The
findings suggest that both patenting and secrecy might be adopted depending on specific
conditions. We extend the analysis to also consider the accidental leakage of a trade
secret to the public.
3.2 Empirical Literature
Investment in R&D is essential for economic growth and progress (Metrick and Ya-
suda, 2011). The gross expenditure in R&D as a percentage of GDP in 2015 was about
three percent of the US economy and in the range of two to three percent of the major
EU economies (OECD, 2017). Although R&D is not categorised as an intangible as-
set in the balance sheet, it is closely related to investment in innovation. R&D might,
in fact, be one of the main sources of intellectual property. However, in order to pre-
serve their incentives to invest in R&D, firms should be able to recover (at least in part)
their innovative efforts or appropriate returns on investments. Patents and secrecy—at
least theoretically, if not practically—serve such an underlying protective and stimulating
purpose. Nevertheless, they are imperfect means of protection. Patents might provide
weak protection or be invalid or invented around, while trade secrets might be obtained
improperly, re-invented, or accidentally leaked out (Dreyfuss, 1998; Hall, 2007). Decker
(2003) discussed a famous US legal dispute regarding the improper use of secrecy, namely
11For more information regarding the dilemma on how much new and valuable information an
innovating firm should disclose and how much it should conceal, refer to Anton and Yao (2004): they
consider incomplete information, imitation, and limited legal protection.
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the Procter & Gamble lawsuit against Potlatch Corporation regarding the theft of secret
methods used in manufacturing paper. These imperfections of patents and secrecy might
have an adverse impact on investment and technological progress.
In addition, consider imitation, which might also lead to the imperfect appropriability
of returns from industrial R&D (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).
For example, Mansfield et al. (1981) show that over half of the patents in their surveyed
sample are imitated within four years after their initial introduction. This finding might
explain why innovating firms have difficulty in appropriating returns from investment in
R&D. Mansfield (1985) examined the speed that technological information leaks to the
public. He suggests that the high speed and large scale of leakage of industrial technology
might explain the difficulties of US public policy in preventing the export of US inventions
overseas. In a follow-up paper, Mansfield (1986) studied the importance of the patent
system in the development and commercialisation of inventions across industries and over
time. He argues that only in very few industries, namely pharmaceuticals and chemicals,
does the patent system play a substantial role in the introduction of new inventions. He
then finds that firms tend to patent patentable inventions, regardless of the availability
of other protection choices. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a reduction in patent
use due to a shift to other means of protection.
Levin et al. (1987) conducted a survey among US firms in the manufacturing sector
to empirically examine the effectiveness of patents and other means of appropriation in
preventing imitation. They suggest that patenting technological inventions is not an
effective means of appropriation. The amount of information disclosure under the patent
system lessens the effectiveness of patents because it facilitates inventing around them.
Specifically, only three out of the 25 industries into which the manufacturing sector is
divided consider patents to be a partially effective means of appropriation. On one hand,
the ineffectiveness of patents might challenge their widespread use in the industry. On
the other hand, other strategic purposes of patents might appear, thus justifying their
extended use. Park and Ginarte (1997) constructed an index that measures the strength
of patent protection and used it to explore economic growth. They suggest that increasing
the strength of IPRs might foster economic growth by stimulating investment in R&D.
In a companion paper, Ginarte and Park (1997) examined the factors that determine
the strength of patent protection. They argue that more-developed economies respect
IPRs more than less-developed ones. Specifically, it is the level of R&D activity, market
structure (freedom), and international integration (openness) that might determine the
level of protection afforded by a nation to patents. Cohen et al. (2000) conducted another
survey among firms in the manufacturing sector to identify the most important reasons
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that lead US firms to decide whether to patent, similar to Levin et al. (1987). The authors
report an increasing tendency of firms to use secrets as a protection mechanism, as well
as a growing concern from the firms regarding the reliance on patents.
Arundel (2001), considering patents as a mutually exclusive alternative to secrecy,
suggests that secrecy can be at least as effective as patents. Furthermore, he argues that
patents are often used by small firms as a protection tool against infringement disputes
initiated by large firms. This might, in turn, explain why small firms rely mostly on
secrecy, while large firms prefer patents. In addition, Yang and Maskus (2001) suggest
that licensing by US multinational corporations increase in frequency as the strength
of IPRs increase. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) focused on the relationship between the
strength of patent protection and the licensing of proprietary technology. Their study
shows that the propensity to patent might increase with patent strength if the firm lacks
the knowledge to commercialise new technological inventions. On the contrary, patent
strength might increase the propensity to patent, but might reduce the propensity to
license, if the firm has the know-how to sell new inventions. Arora et al. (2008) examined
the impact of patenting on industrial R&D. Their analysis shows that although most
inventions should not be patented, patents in fact provide incentives for R&D. In addition,
the patent system stimulates incumbent firms to undertake research.12
Another strand of the empirical literature focused on patent litigation. For example,
Lerner (1994) developed a proxy to measure the scope of patents. He suggests that the
value of patents has been increasing with the breadth of patent protection. Additionally,
his findings are in accordance with the propositions that valuable patents tend to be
litigated more than less-valuable ones. In addition, Lerner (1995) focused on the litigation
of patents and secrets using a large sample of US manufacturing firms. He shows that
trade secret disputes account for 43 percent of the total litigated cases in the sample.
His findings are also consistent with the argument that small firms rely more on secrecy
because the patenting process is considerably expensive. Lanjouw and Lerner (1998)
surveyed the empirical literature on patent litigation with an emphasis on the benefits of
litigation, the enforcement process, and the expected litigation costs. They suggest that
litigation costs might be used as a strategic means by large firms to win legal disputes
against small ones (see also Lanjouw and Lerner, 1996).
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) suggest that litigation risk might be higher for
small firms because they do not have a patent portfolio to be used for protection against
12For other studies that focus on the relationship between patenting and innovation, refer to Pepall
and Richards (1994), Lanjouw et al. (1998), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Lerner (2002), and Bessen
and Hunt (2007).
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a lawsuit with respect to any single patent (see also Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
In other words, small firms might avoid investing in innovation that requires patents
owned by large firms; this might not constitute a problem for large firms. Maskus (2006)
analysed the impact of stronger IPRs on the diffusion of technology, infringement costs,
and the inventiveness of emerging economies. Galasso and Schankerman (2010) focused
on the settlement of patent infringement disputes using a time factor and an ownership
fragmentation lens. Allison et al. (2011) tested whether a serial patent plaintiff is more
likely to settle before trial and whether the most-litigated patents are more likely to
succeed in court (see also Allison et al., 2009). These studies might serve as useful guides
for empirically testing the theoretical propositions derived from our analysis.
4 Research Design
This section presents an overview of the broad research question that drives this
thesis, with a focus on explaining the intersections and complementarities among the three
appended papers. In addition, we discuss the assumptions and theoretical arguments that
are common throughout the analysis, and those that are specific to each paper. Emphasis
is also placed on describing the methods applied and in discussing the overall importance
and relevance of the analysis.
4.1 Purpose and Research Question
The broad research question, that we try to answer here, is how technology licensing
can be strategically used to maximise the profit of innovating firms (i.e. firms endowed
with intellectual property). Our purpose is to understand the impact of imitation on firms’
licensing behaviour, considering that IPRs are imperfect means of protecting proprietary
technology; and how technology licensing can be used to prevent or settle litigation,
considering that the outcome of court proceedings depends on firms’ litigation costs. In
order to address the broad research question, we consider a particular licensing game
in each paper. Specifically, in the first paper, we focus on the optimal mode of patent
licensing (a fixed fee or a per-unit royalty); in the second paper, we look at the optimal
choice of protection for proprietary technology (patents or secrecy); and in the third
paper, we study the strategic use of technology licensing in a patent infringement dispute
(to settle or to litigate).
These games aim to uncover the factors that determine the strategic use of tech-
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nology licensing by innovating firms. This is important for innovators, scholars, and
policy-makers. For instance, the optimal licensing of a proprietary technology that is
prone to imitation might help firms effectively appropriate returns from investment in
innovation. The importance of augmenting firms’ return appropriation increases in the
case of information-based industries or knowledge-based economies, since innovation is
essential for these markets. This is better understood when considering the implications
of effective return appropriability on the growth of leading knowledge-based economies
such as Sweden, Switzerland, or the Netherlands. Ensuring that IPRs were optimally em-
ployed and respected, encouraged innovation and put these economies on a path towards
sustainable development.
Our analysis might also be useful in partially explaining the difference between the
rates of economic growth of developed and less-developed or emerging economies. In-
tellectual property licensing policies influence the diffusion of technology, which in turn
might affect the evolution of innovation. While presenting at the Global Innovation Index
(GII) 2017 in Geneva, the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO), Francis Gurry, said: ‘Innovation is the engine of economic growth in
an increasingly knowledge-based global economy, but more investment is needed to help
boost human creativity and economic output. Innovation can help transform the current
economic up-swing into longer-term growth.’13 Emerging economies, in particular India
and China, have also shown a distinct interest in and immense progress on the process of
respecting IPRs. This shift in focus towards the stronger protection and enforcement of
IPRs might explain the presence of an emerging economy like China in the world’s top
25 most-innovative countries, according to GII in 2017.
China has traditionally misused IPRs owned by foreign organisations, mainly because
its local organisations did not possess their own intellectual property in high-tech in-
dustries. However, Chinese organisations have been developing their own intellectual
property over the last few decades. Weak protection for and enforcement of IPRs could
not prevent the Chinese IPRs from being copied and used illegally in other emerging
economies such as India. Thus, the up-and-coming Chinese organisations might have
constrained their government to better protect their own IPRs, which in turn might have
raised the overall respect for IPRs (Fishman, 2005). The strengthened legislation, the
amendments to the patent act, the entry into the WIPO, the intensification of R&D by
enterprises, and the greater development of the country, led to an explosion in patent
applications and licensing activities in China (Hu and Jefferson, 2009).
Moreover, exploring the role of imitation and the imperfect protection of IPRs is useful
13For more information regarding the presentation of the GII 2017 in Geneva, see www.wipo.int.
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in understanding the effectiveness of alternative means of protecting intellectual property,
the impact of technology transfer on the incentives of firms to innovate, and the rate of
technological diffusion. Understanding the latter relationships might, in turn, help firms
get closer to achieving their economic objectives and policy-makers in proposing effective
changes to public policy related to IPRs. The theoretical framework developed here can
be extended in a number of ways to be applied towards the study of other situations and
economic phenomena. We will now describe the main assumptions, theoretical arguments,
and research questions that correspond to each paper, as well as bridge the gap between
each paper and the general question posed in the beginning of this section.
Paper I : The first paper aims to determine the optimal licensing choice from the
perspectives of a patent owner and consumers. It also questions the effect of technology
licensing on duplication and competition. Firms often license to pre-empt competing
firms developing alternative technologies or imitations. Hence, the game analysed in
this paper is essentially a trade-off between licensing (sharing technological information)
and choosing not to license (risking rediscovery). Another purpose of licensing might be
to increase the appropriation of returns from investment. However, the effectiveness of
appropriability depends on the ease of imitation, which in turn depends on competition,
the industry, and the strength of the protecting instrument (Schilling, 2013). Specifically,
we extend the analysis of Wang (1998), who studied patent licensing in a Cournot duopoly,
by considering duplication and an industry composed of three firms with asymmetric
per-unit costs. This paper, in fact, introduces the basic assumptions and industrial
organisation principles to be used in the papers to follow. We compare fixed-fee licensing
and royalty licensing of a cost-reducing technology under Cournot competition, where
one of the firms develops and patents a cost-reducing technology and at least one of the
other competing firms might obtain the patented invention through technology transfer
or imitation. Thus, the game is static and acknowledges that patent protection is not
absolute: it only grants temporary contestable exclusivity over the use of an invention.
Moreover, we assume that imitation is perfect, instantaneous, certain, and does not aim
to risk infringement. The game is one of complete information.
The analysis suggests that royalty licensing is at least as attractive as fixed-fee licens-
ing for a patent owner, but might be the least-preferable licensing mode for consumers.
The analysis also suggests that a patent owner might use licensing to prevent duplication.
However, licensing might not be strategically used to select competition during the life
term of the patent. Understanding technology licensing might enable policy-makers to
increase the overall efficiency of the patent system and IPRs at large.
Paper II : This paper uses the basic framework developed in the first paper to explore
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technology licensing when an innovating firm has a choice between patents and secrecy
for protection of its IPRs. Specifically, it questions the effects of patenting and secrecy
on the incentives to license and imitate when the two choices of protection are mutually
exclusive alternatives. This is achieved by comparing the profits of a firm that has a
patented new technology with those of a firm where the same technology is protected by
secrecy. The duration of patents is finite, while that of secrecy is indefinite unless the
secret accidentally leaks to the public. We again assume that the enforcement of IPRs
is imperfect and imitation does not lead to infringement. The game is one of complete
information and static.
We extend the analysis conducted in the first paper in a number of ways. First,
imitation does not happen with certainty. Second, the imitation cost is a function of the
ease and probability of success of imitation. Third, we discount all payoffs with a positive
rate. Last, imitation takes time to materialise. Relaxing the assumptions presented in
the first paper allows a non-trivial analysis of firms’ strategic interactions and technology
licensing. We find that patent protection might be more or less preferable to secrecy
depending on specific conditions. We also show that technology transfer will always
occur if the efficiency of imitating a patented technology and of imitating a secret are
both sufficiently low. The analysis also suggests that the risk of accidental leakage lessens
the attractiveness of trade secret protection and might encourage imitation.
Paper III : The third paper considers a litigation game between an innovating firm
holding a patented cost-reducing technology and a competing firm producing with less-
efficient technology. In particular, we ask what are the factors that drive legal disputes to
private settlement or litigation. The model is an extension of the models developed in the
first two papers. Specifically, we examine how imitation and the strength of the judicial
system affect technology licensing and litigation. A distinctive feature of this static model
is that it considers imitation to be imperfect. In addition, we assume that the probability
of imitation depends on firms’ litigation costs and, therefore, is endogenously determined.
The cost of imitation is also assumed to be endogenous, thus bringing the analysis closer to
approximating real-world legal disputes. The game is again one of complete information.
We find that if litigants expect to settle the dispute privately and the magnitude of
innovation is sufficiently small, technology transfer will occur before imitation (an ex-ante
licence). If firms expect a private settlement but the innovation size is sufficiently large,
the outcome of the game depends on the efficiency of imitation. Specifically, if imitation
is highly efficient, technology transfer will occur after imitation (an ex-post licence); if
the efficiency of imitation is sufficiently low, litigation will not occur. The analysis also
suggests that changes in policy instruments, such as the award of damages, might have
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an effect on technology licensing and firms’ profit distributions.
The three appended papers address the broad research question posed in the beginning
of the section. First, we develop an integrated framework that can be used to examine
technology licensing and patent litigation, acknowledging the imperfect legal protection
of IPRs, perfect and imperfect imitation, and the strength of the judicial system. Most
notably, the framework is parsimonious and suitable for studying the strategic licensing
of proprietary technology that is prone to imitation. It can also be used to address other
broad questions posed by studies on the economics of innovation.
4.2 Methods
In principle, this thesis examines the strategic licensing of intellectual property under
the threat of imitation. However, licensing depends on a number of factors and policy
changes which might affect the incentives of firms to engage in R&D (Bessen, 2003; Hunt,
2006). The analysis of these relationships is mainly conducted using industrial organi-
sation, which is an area of economics that studies strategic behaviour among firms and
market structure, as well as game theory, which is the mathematical modelling of strategic
interactions among agents. Additional perspectives from economics, law, management,
and strategy have also been used across the papers. The main methods employed to
address the questions posed are further explained below.
Industrial organisation is a typical method used to study the strategic behaviour and
interaction of firms in imperfect markets. However, according to Martin (2001), indus-
trial organisation covers more than just the study of imperfectly competitive markets;
it extends to almost all branches of economics and economic modelling that deal with
market organisation, negotiation, collusion, and intellectual property, to name a few.
Einav and Levin (2010) explored the use of theoretical industrial organisation to exam-
ine the behaviour of firms with the goal of understanding and explaining the causes and
consequences of deviations from perfect competition. Transaction costs, economies of
scale, and firms’ strategic behaviour are some of the factors that determine the structure
of industries in the economy. Market structures characterised by firms that undertake
anticompetitive actions or industries that are highly concentrated indicate imperfectly
competitive markets. This, in turn, warrants further research and potential govern-
mental intervention. In this doctoral thesis, we study the interesting topics of market
organisation such as technology licensing games characterised by conflicts of interest and
entry deterrence.
Game theory enables industrial organisation to address problems such as product dif-
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ferentiation, barriers to entry, collusion, and asymmetric information (moral hazard and
adverse selection) (Tirole, 1988). Most notably, game theory is a branch of the social
sciences that studies strategic decision-making (Dixit and Nalebuff, 2008). Therefore,
game theory is essential to determine the outcome of an economic situation characterised
by firms whose actions depend on the actions of other competing firms in the industry.
The unit of analysis throughout this thesis is a profit-maximising innovating firm. The
concept of equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, namely subgame per-
fection. We consider the Nash subgame perfect equilibrium to be appropriate for the
analysis because it determines the equilibrium outcome in each subgame of the complete
game. In particular, two oligopolistic settings are used, namely a duopoly and a three-
firm oligopoly. Moreover, we assume that firms with symmetric or asymmetric per-unit
costs compete simultaneously in quantities of a homogeneous good. The hypothetical
market that characterises the licensing games is then an imperfectly competitive indus-
try. The most common model of imperfect market competition is the Cournot model
of an oligopoly; we therefore employ a standard Cournot-Nash model throughout our
analysis (Cournot and Fisher, 1929; Martin, 2001).
There are numerous existing studies that focus on the impact of imitation on economic
activity. Nevertheless, the imitation of intellectual property is a phenomenon that calls for
both further analysis and effective public policies. The theoretical and empirical literature
reviewed before gives support to the research design of this thesis. On one hand, the
use of economic theory, industrial organisation practices, and game-theoretic principles
make up an integrated theoretical approach that aims to understand the mechanics of
technology licensing in imperfectly competitive markets. On the other hand, there are
some limitations regarding the choice of methods. Extending the analysis to include an
arbitrary number of firms and information asymmetry might contribute to the underlying
purpose of this thesis and its applied impact. Further theoretical and empirical work is
needed to assert the applied validity of this thesis’ propositions.
5 Conclusions
This section contains the main findings and contributions of the thesis, relative to
the existing literature. It also includes potential extensions to the appended papers and
directions for future research.
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5.1 Findings and Contributions
Intellectual property consists of patents, trade secrets, copyrights, and many other
instruments. Patents—temporary property rights on technological inventions—might be
the most important form of IPRs related to technology transfer, especially in relation
to chemical products and mechanical inventions. However, patenting is a choice and
might not be suitable to protect all kinds of inventions. Some technologies might be bet-
ter protected via secrecy, depending on the nature of the technological information and
knowledge: consider the technologies related to national security, military, and aerospace.
Nevertheless, the relative importance of patents and secrecy depends on the firm’s size,
the complex nature of the legal framework that supports them, the country’s legal en-
vironment, the level of effective enforcement of those mechanisms, and firms’ strategic
motivations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Another important factor that affects this trade-
off is imitation, an intellectual property phenomenon that needs to be addressed by aca-
demics, practitioners, courts, and policy-makers in their decision-making processes. We
focus on the adverse impact of imitation on the incentives to innovate.14 We develop an
integrated theoretical framework, comprising the imperfect protection of IPRs, imitation,
and bargaining, with the aim of understanding the strategic use of technology licensing.
We study these issues in a hypothetical oligopolistic setting, where firms compete si-
multaneously in quantities and imitation might occur. The broad question is how strategic
licensing can be used optimally so as to maximise the profit of an innovating firm that has
a protected cost-reducing technology. Within this broad area, there are several specific
questions that we address using different licensing games. The first set of questions relate
to the optimal mode of patent licensing; the second to the optimal choice of protection
for intellectual property; and the third to the relationship between technology licensing
and patent infringement. We conclude with the following propositions.
We show that the mode of licensing intellectual property is a strategic choice that
depends on the relative magnitudes of the per-unit production costs, innovation, and
imitation cost. Typically, royalty licensing might be preferable to fixed-fee licensing for a
patent owner, while the converse is generally true for consumers. A per-unit royalty might
be superior for a patent owner because it raises the per-unit costs of licensees. Royalty
rates are more adjustable than fixed fees, and might in turn be chosen optimally so as
to yield monopoly rent. Next, the analysis suggests that licensing might be strategically
used to prevent imitation. However, there is no indication that licensing might be used
selectively to affect competition during the life term of the patent. A patent owner might
14Note, however, that imitation might also encourage investment in innovation (Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007).
21
also benefit by licensing either to a weak or a strong competitor, depending on specific
conditions.
In addition, we find that the choice of protection affects technology licensing. Patents
might be more or less preferable than secrecy for a technology owner, depending on
imitation and the strength of protection. When imitation is not sufficiently efficient,
licensing might prevail; however, if imitation is efficient, then imitation might be optimal.
Furthermore, the risk of leakage and its increasing relationship with the number of firms
practising the protected technology might increase the attractiveness of, and consequently
reliance on, patent protection.
Moreover, the analysis suggests that the type of invention and imitation, and the legal
system have an impact on technology licensing. Specifically, when settlement in private
is expected to occur, small inventions might be licensed before imitation (an ex-ante
licence), while large ones might have the opposite effect (an ex-post licence). Also, a
patent owner benefits by taking no action against a highly imperfect imitation.
We contribute to the existing literature by providing an integrated framework that
examines strategic licensing and technology transfer. We revisit existing studies within
this field of research, but from an imitation lens. Finally, this thesis adds to the discourse
and emphasises the need to further examine the use of IPRs to appropriate returns from
innovation and their use for objectives other than appropriation, mainly as strategic tools
in business.
5.2 Future Research
The analysis used throughout this thesis can be used to further research a number of
other interesting themes. The findings revealed the relations among technology licensing,
innovation, imitation, and litigation. However, we could also focus on other interesting
avenues of research.
A straightforward avenue for future research is to extend our analysis to compare and
contrast licensing when a technology owner is an outsider and the competition setting is
dynamic (Stackelberg). Extending the analysis from a static to a dynamic game allows the
consideration of the dimension of time and, thus, the analysis of the effect of lengthy legal
procedures on the decision-making processes of innovating firms. Moreover, it will allow
a focus on alternative strategic reasons of firms to deter settlement, such as litigating now
in order to gain better licensing terms in the future, or other similar behaviour (consider,
for example, patent hold-up and hold-out, which have only been partially modelled in
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the existing literature).
Another direction for future research is to examine the patent licensing of proprietary
technology when the validity of the patent is uncertain. This is a standard issue that ex-
isting studies have addressed. However, further research is needed to analyse the strategic
use of weak patents with an aim towards enhancing the bargaining position of a patent
owner with competing firms that might also imitate the protected technology. In this
case, preliminary injunctive relief awarded by the court can also be incorporated into the
analysis. The economic modelling of optimal technology licensing and litigation of IPRs
is extensive, but still does not explicitly examine the impact of preliminary injunctive
relief on firms’ strategic behaviour to delay or avoid licensing payments.
It is also interesting to study licensing games in the context of collaboration or collu-
sion (cooperative games). Coordinated behaviour often increases firms’ profits and, thus,
it has been practised by firms for a long time. Additionally, coordinated or collusive be-
haviour might be used to prevent entry, achieve different strategic objectives, or enhance
firms’ positions within an industry. In particular, collusive behaviour is anti-competitive,
inheriting specific risks. In an attempt to study collusion in a Cournot-Nash setting—
similar as to the games discussed in this thesis—a number of factors should be taken
into consideration such as: the number of firms in the industry, the ease of negotiating
and enforcing an agreement, and the expected gain relative to punishment if collusion is
detected. Analysing cooperative licensing games when IPRs are imperfect and imitation
is probable, might aid regulators in examining anti-competitive practices.
In addition, firms might rely on different protection and licensing mechanisms at dif-
ferent stages of their R&D. For instance, they can rely on secrecy before launching a
technological invention and apply patent protection immediately after its launch. Fur-
thermore, other instruments that we did not consider in our analysis might also be em-
ployed (e.g. relying on lead time with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage early
in the process, and subsequently deterring imitation by competing firms). Hence, inno-
vating firms differ in the extent and use of protection instruments. This heterogeneity in
behaviours might be related to idiosyncratic firm factors (firm size and strategic goals),
to technology-specific factors (innovation size and ease of imitation), industry-specific
factors (market structure and the appropriation of returns from investment), and insti-
tutional factors (legal protection and the enforcement of IPRs). The importance of the
aforementioned factors is of immense interest and could be assessed in future research.
Finally, technology licensing and firms’ incentives to innovate is also of intense interest
to regulatory institutions and policy-makers. The existing literature has generated a
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tremendous amount of policy suggestions and implications. However, new theoretical and
further empirical work can be conducted to analyse the impact of policy interventions
on social welfare. Intellectual property is an important driver of progress, and firms
often do not have clear protection, usage, and appropriation strategies with respect to
it. Moreover, these strategies vary over time and across industries and legal systems.
The continuously rising value of intellectual property is increasing the awareness of the
strategic use of IPRs, consequently increasing the relative importance of further research
on the economics of innovation.
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